III. JURISPRUDENCE

ICCPR

•	Tadman et al. v. Canada (816/1998), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (29 October 1999) 218 at paras. 1.2, 6.2 and 7.

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1.2 In the province of Ontario Roman Catholic schools are the only non-secular schools receiving full and direct public funding. The authors, however, belong to different religious denominations, i.e. United Church of Canada, Lutheran Church, Serbian Orthodox Church and Humanist. They all have children in the school going age and their children are being educated in the public school system.

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6.2 The State party has challenged the admissibility of the communication on the basis that the authors cannot claim to be victims of a violation of the Covenant. In this context, the Committee notes that the authors while claiming to be victims of discrimination, do not seek publicly funded religious schools for their children, but on the contrary seek the removal of the public funding to Roman Catholic separate schools. Thus, if this were to happen, the authors' personal situation in respect of funding for religious education would not be improved. The authors have not sufficiently substantiated how the public funding given to the Roman Catholic separate schools at present causes them any disadvantage or affects them adversely. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that they cannot claim to be victims of the alleged discrimination, within the meaning of article 1 of the Optional Protocol.

7. Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee decides:

(a) that the communication is inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol...

For dissenting opinion in this context, see Tadman et al. v. Canada (816/1998), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (29 October 1999) 218 at Individual Opinion by P. Bhagwati, E. Evatt, L. Henkin and C. Medina Quiroga, 226.

•	Waldman v. Canada (694/1996), ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. II (3 November 1999) 86 (CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996) at paras. 10.2, 10.4-10.6 and Individual Opinion by Martin Scheinin (concurring), 100 at paras. 3-5.

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10.2 The issue before the Committee is whether public funding for Roman Catholic schools, but not for schools of the author's religion, which results in him having to meet the full cost of education in religious school, constitutes a violation of the author's rights under the Covenant.

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10.4 The Committee begins by noting that the fact that a distinction is enshrined in the Constitution does not render it reasonable and objective. In the instant case, the distinction was made in 1867 to protect the Roman Catholics in Ontario. The material before the Committee does not show that members of the Roman Catholic community or any identifiable section of that community are now in a disadvantaged position compared to those members of the Jewish community that wish to secure the education of their children in religious schools. Accordingly, the Committee rejects the State party's argument that the preferential treatment of Roman Catholic schools is nondiscriminatory because of its Constitutional obligation.

10.5 With regard to the State party's argument that it is reasonable to differentiate in the allocation of public funds between private and public schools, the Committee notes that it is not possible for members of religious denominations other than Roman Catholic to have their religious schools incorporated within the public school system. In the instant case, the author has sent his children to a private religious school, not because he wishes a private non-Government dependent education for his children, but because the publicly funded school system makes no provision for his religious denomination, whereas publicly funded religious schools are available to members of the Roman Catholic faith. On the basis of the facts before it, the Committee considers that the differences in treatment between Roman Catholic religious schools, which are publicly funded as a distinct part of the public education system, and schools of the author's religion, which are private by necessity, cannot be considered reasonable and objective.

10.6 The Committee has noted the State party's argument that the aims of the State party's secular public education system are compatible with the principle of nondiscrimination laid down in the Covenant. The Committee...notes, however, that the proclaimed aims of the system do not justify the exclusive funding of Roman Catholic religious schools...[T]he Covenant does not oblige States parties to fund schools which are established on a religious basis. However, if a State party chooses to provide public funding to religious schools, it should make this funding available without discrimination. This means that providing funding for the schools of one religious group and not for another must be based on reasonable and objective criteria. In the instant case, the Committee concludes that the material before it does not show that the differential treatment between the Roman Catholic faith and the author's religious denomination is based on such criteria. Consequently, there has been a violation of the author's rights under article 26 of the Covenant to equal and effective protection against discrimination.

Individual Opinion by Martin Scheinin (concurring)

While I concur with the Committee's finding that the author is a victim of a violation of article 26 of the Covenant, I wish to explain my reasons for such a conclusion.

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3. In the present case the Committee correctly focussed its attention on article 26. Although both General Comment No. 22 [48] and the Hartikainen case are related to article 18, there is a considerable degree of interdependence between that provision and the non-discrimination clause in article 26. In general, arrangements in the field of religious education that are in compliance with article 18 are likely to be in conformity with article 26 as well, because non-discrimination is a fundamental component in the test under article 18 (4). In the cases of Blom v. Sweden (Communication No. 191/1985) and Lundgren et al. and Hjord et al. v. Sweden (Communications 288 and 299/1988) the Committee elaborated its position in the question what constitutes discrimination in the field of education. While the Committee left open whether the Covenant entails, in certain situations, an obligation to provide some public funding for private schools, it concluded that the fact that private schools, freely chosen by the parents and their children, do not receive the same level of funding as public schools does not amount to discrimination.

4. In the Province of Ontario, the system of public schools provides for religious instruction in one religion but adherents of other religious denominations must arrange for their religious education either outside school hours or by establishing private religious schools. Although arrangements exist for indirect public funding to existing private schools, the level of such funding is only a fraction of the costs incurred to the families, whereas public Roman Catholic schools are free. This difference in treatment between adherents of the Roman Catholic religion and such adherents of other religions that wish to provide religious schools for their children is, in the Committee's view, discriminatory. While I concur with this finding I wish to point out that the existence of public Roman Catholic schools in Ontario is related to a historical arrangement for minority protection and hence needs to be addressed not only under article 26 of the Covenant but also under articles 27 and 18. The question whether the arrangement in question should be discontinued is a matter of public policy and the general design of the educational system within the State party, not a requirement under the Covenant.

5. When implementing the Committee's views in the present case the State party should in my opinion bear in mind that article 27 imposes positive obligations for States to promote religious instruction in minority religions, and that providing such education as an optional arrangement within the public education system is one permissible arrangement to that end. Providing for publicly funded education in minority languages for those who wish to receive such education is not as such discriminatory, although care must of course be taken that possible distinctions between different minority languages are based on objective and reasonable grounds. The same rule applies in relation to religious education in minority religions. In order to avoid discrimination in funding religious (or linguistic) education for some but not all minorities States may legitimately base themselves on whether there is a constant demand for such education. For many religious minorities the existence of a fully secular alternative within the public school system is sufficient, as the communities in question wish to arrange for religious education outside school hours and outside school premises. And if demands for religious schools do arise, one legitimate criterion for deciding whether it would amount to discrimination not to establish a public minority school or not to provide comparable public funding to a private minority school is whether there is a sufficient number of children to attend such a school so that it could operate as a viable part in the overall system of education. In the present case this condition was met. Consequently, the level of indirect public funding allocated to the education of the author's children amounted to discrimination when compared to the full funding of public Roman Catholic schools in Ontario.

•	Leirvåg v. Norway (1155/2003), ICCPR, A/60/40 vol. II (3 November 2004) 203 at paras. 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, 14.2-14.7, 15 and 16.

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2.3 In August 1997, the Norwegian government introduced a new mandatory religious subject in the Norwegian school system, entitled "Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education" (hereafter referred to as CKREE) replacing the previous Christianity subject and the life stance subject. This new subject only provides for exemption from certain limited segments of the teaching. The new Education Act's §2(4) stipulates that education provided in the CKREE subject shall be based on the schools' Christian object clause 1/ and provide "thorough knowledge of the Bible and Christianity as a cultural heritage and Evangelical-Lutheran Faith". During the preparation of the Act, the Parliament instructed the Ministry to obtain a professional evaluation of the Act's relationship with human rights. This evaluation was carried out by the then Appeals Court judge Erik Møse, who stated that:

"As the situation stands, I find that the safest option is a general right of exemption. This will mean that the international inspectorate bodies will not involve themselves with the questions of the doubt raised by compulsory education. However, I cannot state that the partial exemption will be in contravention of the conventions. The premise is that one establishes an arrangement that in practice lies within their (the conventions') frameworks. Much will depend on the further legislative process and the actual implementation of the subject."

2.4 The Ministry's circular on the subject states that: "When pupils request exemption, written notification of this shall be sent to the school. The notification must state the reason for what they experience as the practice of another religion or affiliation to a different life stance in the tutoring." A later circular from the Ministry states that demands for exemption on grounds other than those governed by clearly religious activities must be assessed on the basis of strict criteria.

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2.8 Several organizations representing minorities with different beliefs voiced strong objections to the CKREE subjects. After school started in the autumn of 1997, a number of parents, including the authors, demanded full exemption from relevant instruction. Their applications were rejected by the schools concerned, and on administrative appeal to the Regional Director of Education, on the ground that such exemption was not authorized under the Act.

2.9 On 14 March 1998, the NHA and the parents of eight pupils, including the authors in the present case, instituted proceedings before the Oslo City Court. By judgement of 16 April 1999, the Oslo City Court rejected the authors' claims. On 6 October 2000, upon appeal, the Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The decision was confirmed upon further appeal, by the Supreme Court in its judgement of 22 August 2001, thus it is claimed that domestic remedies have been exhausted. Three of the other parents in the national court suit, and the NHA, decided to bring their complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter denominated ECHR)).

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14.2 The main issue before the Committee is whether the compulsory instruction of the CKREE subject in Norwegian schools, with only limited possibility of exemption, violates the authors' right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under article 18 and more specifically the right of parents to secure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions, pursuant to article 18, paragraph 4. The scope of article 18 covers not only protection of traditional religions, but also philosophies of life, 12/ such as those held by the authors. Instruction in religion and ethics may in the Committee's view be in compliance with article 18, if carried out under the terms expressed in the Committee's general comment No. 22 on article 18: "[A]rticle 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way", and "public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18, paragraph 4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents or guardians." The Committee also recalls its Views in Hartikainen et al. v. Finland, where it concluded that instruction in a religious context should respect the convictions of parents and guardians who do not believe in any religion. It is within this legal context that the Committee will examine the claim.

14.3 Firstly, the Committee will examine the question of whether or not the instruction of the CKREE subject is imparted in a neutral and objective way. On this issue, the Education Act, section 2-4, stipulates that: "Teaching on the subject shall not involve preaching. Teachers of Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education shall take as their point of departure the object clause of the primary and lower secondary school laid down in section 1-2, and present Christianity, other religions and philosophies of life on the basis of their distinctive characteristics. Teaching of the different topics shall be founded on the same educational principles". In the object clause in question it is prescribed that the object of primary and lower secondary education shall be "in agreement and cooperation with the home, to help to give pupils a Christian and moral upbringing". Some of the travaux préparatoires of the Act referred to above make it clear that the subject gives priority to tenets of Christianity over other religions and philosophies of life. In that context, the Standing Committee on Education concluded, in its majority, that: the tuition was not neutral in value, and that the main emphasis of the subject was instruction on Christianity. The State party acknowledges that the subject has elements that may be perceived as being of a religious nature, these being the activities exemption from which is granted without the parents having to give reasons. Indeed, at least some of the activities in question involve, on their face, not just education in religious knowledge, but the actual practice of a particular religion... It also transpires from the research results invoked by the authors, and from their personal experience that the subject has elements that are not perceived by them as being imparted in a neutral and objective way. The Committee concludes that the teaching of CKREE cannot be said to meet the requirement of being delivered in a neutral and objective way, unless the system of exemption in fact leads to a situation where the teaching provided to those children and families opting for such exemption will be neutral and objective.

14.4 The second question to be examined thus is whether the partial exemption arrangements and other avenues provide "for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents or guardians". The Committee notes the authors' contention that the partial exemption arrangements do not satisfy their needs, since teaching of the CKREE subject leans too heavily towards religious instruction, and that partial exemption is impossible to implement in practice. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the Norwegian Education Act provides that "on the basis of written notification from parents, pupils shall be exempted from attending those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they, on the basis of their own religion or philosophy of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life".

14.5 The Committee notes that the existing normative framework related to the teaching of the CKREE subject contains internal tensions or even contradictions. On the one hand, the Constitution and the object clause in the Education Act contain a clear preference for Christianity as compared to the role of other religions and worldviews in the educational system. On the other hand, the specific clause on exemptions in section 2-4 of the Education Act is formulated in a way that in theory appears to give a full right of exemption from any part of the CKREE subject that individual pupils or parents perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life. If this clause could be implemented in a way that addresses the preference reflected in the Constitution and the object clause of the Education Act, this could arguably be considered as complying with article 18 of the Covenant.

14.6 The Committee considers, however, that even in the abstract, the present system of partial exemption imposes a considerable burden on persons in the position of the authors, insofar as it requires them to acquaint themselves with those aspects of the subject which are clearly of a religious nature, as well as with other aspects, with a view to determining which of the other aspects they may feel a need to seek - and justify - exemption from. Nor would it be implausible to expect that such persons would be deterred from exercising that right, insofar as a regime of partial exemption could create problems for children which are different from those that may be present in a total exemption scheme. Indeed as the experience of the authors demonstrates, the system of exemptions does not currently protect the liberty of parents to ensure that the religious and moral education of their children is in conformity with their own convictions. In this respect, the Committee notes that the CKREE subject combines education on religious knowledge with practising a particular religious belief, e.g. learning by heart of prayers, singing religious hymns or attendance at religious services... While it is true that in these cases parents may claim exemption from these activities by ticking a box on a form, the CKREE scheme does not ensure that education of religious knowledge and religious practice are separated in a way that makes the exemption scheme practicable.

14.7 In the Committee's view, the difficulties encountered by the authors, in particular the fact that Maria Jansen and Pia Suzanne Orning had to recite religious texts in the context of a Christmas celebration although they were enrolled in the exemption scheme, as well as the loyalty conflicts experienced by the children, amply illustrate these difficulties. Furthermore, the requirement to give reasons for exempting children from lessons focusing on imparting religious knowledge and the absence of clear indications as to what kind of reasons would be accepted creates a further obstacle for parents who seek to ensure that their children are not exposed to certain religious ideas. In the Committee's view, the present framework of CKREE, including the current regime of exemptions, as it has been implemented in respect of the authors, constitutes a violation of article 18, paragraph 4, of the Covenant in their respect.

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15. The Human Rights Committee...is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 18, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.

16. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective and appropriate remedy that will respect the right of the authors as parents to ensure and as pupils to receive an education that is in conformity with their own convictions. The State party is under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future.

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Notes

1/ Paragraph 2 (4) of the Education Act reads as follows: "Section 2-4. Teaching the subject CKREE. Exemption from regulations, etc: Teaching in CKREE shall:

- Provide a thorough knowledge of the Bible and Christianity both as cultural heritage and Evangelical-Lutheran faith;

- Provide knowledge of other Christian denominations;

- Provide knowledge of other world religions and philosophies of life, ethical and philosophical topics;

- Promote understanding and respect for Christian and humanist values and;

- Promote understanding, respect and the ability to carry out a dialogue between people with different views concerning beliefs and philosophies of life.

CKREE is an ordinary school subject that shall normally be attended by all pupils. Teaching in the subject shall not involve preaching.

Teachers of CKREE shall take as their point of departure the objects clause of the primary and lower secondary school laid down in section 1-2, and present Christianity, other religions and philosophies of life on the basis of their distinctive characteristics. Teaching of the different topics shall be founded on the same educational principles.

On the basis of written notification from parents, pupils shall be exempted from attending those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they, on the basis of their own religion or philosophy of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life. This may involve religious activities either in or outside the classroom. In cases where exemption is notified, the school shall, as far as possible and especially in the lower primary school, seek solutions involving differentiated teaching within the curriculum.

Pupils who have reached the age of 15 may themselves give written notification pursuant to the fourth paragraph."

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12/ General comment No. 22 on article 18, adopted on 30 July 1993.

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